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or the bankruptcy court that has exclusive jurisdiction. Part II discusses the Concurrent
Jurisdiction Theory.
Discussion
I.

Exclusive Jurisdiction Theory

Some courts have found that one authority preempts the other’s jurisdiction when it
comes to rejecting PPAs in bankruptcy. However, courts disagree whether it is the bankruptcy
court or FERC that has exclusive jurisdiction governing energy purchasing agreements. There is
a clear conflict between which entity is controlling in the rejection of PPAs in bankruptcy, given
Congress’ intent in the creation of Bankruptcy Code and the Federal Power Act (the “FPA”). By
creating chapter 11 in the Bankruptcy Code, “Congress sought to protect debtors by permitting
liberal restructuring in bankruptcy,” whereas with the FPA “Congress sought to protect energy
markets and consumers” from monopolistic public utilities by “putting them under the
governance of a commission of experts.”2
A. The Bankruptcy Court Has Exclusive Jurisdiction
To facilitate restructuring, section 365(a) of the Bankruptcy Code allows “trustees” or
“debtors in possession” to reject “any executory contract,” subject to bankruptcy court approval3
and to treat rejection as a breach of contract.4 Rejection of a contract relieves the debtor in
possession of its obligations to continue to perform under unfavorable contracts, something
necessary in a successful reorganization process. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit in In re Mirant Corp first determined that a court is permitted to hear breach of
contract claims where the proposed rejection does not represent a challenge to the agreement’s
filed rate.5 The court held that rejection would only have an indirect effect on the filed rate

See In re FirstEnergy Solutions Corp., No. 18-3787, WL 6767004, at *24.
11 U.S.C. § 365(a).
4 11 U.S.C. § 365(g).
5 See In re Mirant Corp., 378 F.3d 519 (5th Cir. 2004).
2
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because even though the debtor’s desire to reject the agreement was partially motivated by a
lower market rate, its justification was based on the excess supply and lack of need for any
energy covered by the contract.6 The court also relied on the structure of the Bankruptcy Code,
which it found indicates “that Congress did not intend to limit the ability of utility companies to
reject an executory power contract.”7 The Fifth Circuit found that the lack of exception for
contracts subject to FERC regulation was intentional by Congress, and section 365(a) also
applies to contracts subject to FERC regulation, which allows debtors to reject PPAs in
bankruptcy.8
The Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of California declared that under section
365 of the Bankruptcy Code, a bankruptcy court, not the FERC, had exclusive jurisdiction over
the right to determine whether a debtor would be allowed to reject executory PPAs.9 Following
PG&E’s announcement of its intent to file for relief under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code,
PPA counterparties asked FERC to rule that the bankruptcy court and FERC must both approve
rejection of PPA for rejection to have effect.10 Thereafter, FERC found that it had concurrent
jurisdiction with bankruptcy courts to review whether PPAs could be rejected through
bankruptcy.11 Following the aforementioned hearings, the debtor filed for bankruptcy and was
denied a rehearing by the FERC.12 The bankruptcy court started its analysis stating that the
“Bankruptcy Code is the proper and only authority to apply and not any aspect of the FPA. . . .
The beginning and end of the analysis is in the Bankruptcy Code.”13 The court found that section

See id.
See id. at 521.
8 See id. at 522 (further explaining that nothing in the Bankruptcy Code “limits a public utility’s ability to choose to
reject an executory contract subject to FERC regulation as part of its reorganization process,” therefore finding that
the district court had jurisdiction to reject the debtor’s PPAs.).
9 See In re PG&E Corp. Pacific Gas and Electric Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, Adv. (In re PG&E
Corp.), 603 B.R. 471, 490 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. June 7, 2019).
10 See id. at 476–77.
11 See id.
12 See id. at 485.
13 See id. at 486.
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365 of the Bankruptcy code is subject to exceptions, but no exceptions involve FERC.14 The
bankruptcy court interpreted the absence of reference to FERC and FPA within any of
exceptions, to mean that FERC has no jurisdiction over the rejection of contracts.15 This is
significant because if Congress intended to provide regulatory exceptions to the Bankruptcy
Code it would have expressly done so, as it previously has done. Although courts can defer to
regulatory agencies while analyzing provisions governing the federal agency, the bankruptcy
court held that courts have the final say and the ultimate decision-making authority.16
B. FERC has Exclusive Jurisdiction
Congress has stated that federal regulation of wholesale electric energy prices is
necessary to protect the public interest.17 While energy contracts are privately negotiated, parties
must file those contracts with FERC and they must be certified as “just and reasonable” to be
lawful under the FPA.18 The act of filing these contracts with the FERC transforms them into
becoming federal regulations and only FERC can modify these contracts, if it concludes the
contract will result in a serious harm to the public interest.19
Unlike the foregoing courts, the district court for the Southern District of New York in In
re Calpine Corp., explained that when there “is [jurisdictional] conflict, the power of the
bankruptcy court must yield to that of the federal agency.”20 The court found that it lacked the
jurisdiction to authorize the rejection of PPAs because doing so would interfere with FERC’s
exclusive jurisdiction over the rates, terms, conditions, and duration of the wholesale energy

See id. at 478 (highlighting the fact that “Congress knows how to craft special rules for circumstances”).
See id. at 487 (explaining that the Supreme Court itself has said Congress knows exactly how to grant exceptions
to the power to reject executory contracts and PPAs governed by the FPA were not included).
16 See id. at 486.
17 16 U.S.C. § 824(a).
18 16 U.S.C. § 824d(a).
19 See In re FirstEnergy Solutions Corp., No. 18-3787, WL 6767004, at *24 (6th Cir. Dec. 12, 2019) (explaining that
“[t]he Supreme Court has held that the FERC may compel a party to continue to perform even a money losing
contract”).
20 See In re Calpine Corp., 337 B.R. 27, 34 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
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contacts.21 The utility company there sought bankruptcy court approval to reject the PPAs
because they were the “most financially burdensome” of its energy contracts, following
California’s 2000 energy crisis. Unlike the debtors in In re Mirant, the debtor’s rational for
rejecting the PPAs was based on the reasonableness of the rates. Since FERC has exclusive
jurisdiction to determine whether filed rates are reasonable, the district court held in favor of
FERC. The district court looked to the Bankruptcy Code but found “little evidence of
congressional intent” to limit FERC’s authority, observing that “[a]bsent overriding language,
the Bankruptcy Code should not be read to interfere with FERC jurisdiction.”22 Accordingly, a
debtor cannot achieve in Bankruptcy Court to “cease performance under the rates, terms, and
conditions of filed rate wholesale energy contracts” without seeking FERC approval.23
According to the district court in In re Calpine Corp., the dispositive issue is whether
rejection of the PPAs would directly interfere with FERC’s exclusive jurisdiction over the
wholesale power contracts constitutes a collateral attack on the filed rate.24 The district court
rejected the bankruptcy court’s argument that rejection in the bankruptcy court constitutes a
breach which is outside of FERC’s exclusive jurisdiction since FERC only has exclusive
jurisdiction over the approval, mortification, or termination of wholesale energy contracts not
breaches.25 The district court reasoned that here, “breach” does not create a typical dispute over
the terms of a contract but rather the “unilateral termination of a regulatory obligation.”26 The
district court took the view that once the energy contracts were filed, the FPA controls rather

See id. at 36.
See id. at 33.
23 See id. at 36.
24 See id.
25 See id.
26 See id.
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than contract law because the PPAs went from mere contracts to regulated duties, and as such,
regulatory action from FERC is required to eliminate such duties.27
II.

Concurrent Jurisdiction Theory
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit’s position in harmonizing the

two opposing statutes is that the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction while concurrent with the FERC,
is nonetheless primary or superior to the FERC’s position.28 In In re FirstEnergy Solutions
Corp. the debtor, FES, wanted to file for chapter 11 and reject their executory PPAs because they
were losing an estimated $46 million per year on these contracts.29 FES filed a chapter 11
petition under the Bankruptcy Code, and then filed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgement
that the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction is superior to the FERC arguing that the PPAs were just a
small part of its bankruptcy restructuring.30 The Sixth Circuit noted that the PPAs were for a very
small quantity of electricity in relation to FES’s total electricity capacity, .75%, and viewed in
this light the public interest in the fulfillment of these contracts was very small. Thus, no
consumers will suffer electricity shortage, and counterparties can sell their electricity into the
market at a minimal, if any, loss.31 The Sixth Circuit reasoned that the public necessity of the
available functional bankruptcy relief is superior to the necessity of FERC’s exclusive authority
to regulate energy contracts and markets.32
Additionally, the Sixth Circuit held that in some cases a bankruptcy court may enjoin
FERC from issuing an order that would “directly conflict with the bankruptcy court’s orders or
interfere with its otherwise-authorized authority.”33 However, the Sixth Circuit stated that a

See id. at 37. “[W]hat FERC giveth, only FERC may taketh away.” Id.
See In re FirstEnergy Solutions Corp., No. 18-3787, WL 6767004, at *16.
29 Id. at *4 (REC requirements were relaxed by the government resulting in an abundance of RECs available for
purchase. FES no longer had commercial or regulatory need for the RECs from the PPAs).
30 Id. at 11.
31 See id.
32 See id.
33 See id.
27
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bankruptcy court cannot issue an absolute injunction preventing FERC from conducting its
regulatory mandated assessment and must instead “invite FERC to participate and provide an
opinion” in accordance with the FPA.34 This holding is highly fact dependent because in In re
FirstEnergy Solutions Corp. the Sixth Circuit reasoned that to be effective, restructuring must be
an expeditious process, which at times can result in unfair or harmful consequences to other
concerned parties including the general public.35 Thus, it would be unreasonable in all cases to
permit public interest concerns to overrule a restructuring decision or to have to wait for “FERC
to conduct a full hearing to identify, assess, and opine on those concurs.”36 While courts
generally defer to an agency’s jurisdiction, courts are also capable of considering public-interest
issues.37 More recently, the Sixth Circuit denied FERC’s rehearing position.
Conclusion
Courts and debtors are left with two opposing theories to determine whether bankruptcy
courts or FERC have exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction in the rejection of executory PPAs in
bankruptcy. These opposing theories have resulted in three different outcomes: bankruptcy court
has exclusive jurisdiction, FERC has exclusive jurisdiction, or both share concurrent jurisdiction.
The Ninth Circuit will be the next Circuit Court to consider this issue, as the PE&G Corp.
bankruptcy court certified its decision for direct appeal. Regardless of which way the Ninth
Circuit holds, there will continue to be a circuit split on the issue.

Id. at *32.
See id. at *24.
36 Id.
37 Id. (“FERC commissioners are not the only people capable of considering public-interest issues.”).
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